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The ICC Judgment in Al Mahdi: Heritage
Communities and Restorative Justice in the
International Criminal Protection of Cultural
Heritage
Simona Pinton, Ph.D.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last century, rules in multiple international treaties have prohibited
attacks on cultural property, and politicians, journalists, and scholars have
publicly condemned them. Since the Nuremberg trials,1 however, the
international protection of cultural heritage by means of judicial
proceedings (both civil and criminal) intensified only in the last two
decades, as explained below.
At the international criminal law level, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the first to adopt
international laws criminalizing direct attacks to destroy buildings
dedicated to religion and historic monuments. In the cases Prosecutor v.
1
At the Nuremberg trials, Alfred Rosenberg, in addition to the commission of serious
war crimes and crimes against humanity, was recognized
responsible for a system of organized plunder of both public and private
property throughout the invaded countries of Europe. Acting under Hitler’s
orders of January 1940, to set up the “Hohe Schule,” he organized and directed
the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg,” which plundered museums and libraries,
confiscated art treasures and collections, and pillaged private houses. His own
reports show the extent of the confiscations. In “Action-M” (Moebel),
instituted in December 1941 at Rosenberg’s suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes
were plundered in the West, 38,000 of them in Paris alone, and it took 26,984
railroad cars to transport the confiscated furnishings to Germany. As of July
14th, 1944, more than 21,903 art objects, including famous paintings and
museum pieces, had been seized by the Einsatzstab in the west.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI
CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 122–123 (1947).
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Kordić, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Prosecutor v. Jokić, and Prosecutor v. Prlić,
the charges were brought by the prosecution under art. 3(d) of the ICTY
Statute which gave the ad hoc Tribunal jurisdiction over violations of the
laws or customs of war, including: “seizure of, destruction or willful
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the
arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science.”2 Those
acts, however, have been treated by the ad hoc Tribunal as auxiliary to the
crimes concerning attacks on people.
In 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) focused on the sole
charge of crimes against cultural property in the Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi
2
In Kordić, the Trial Chamber (TC) recognized that “the destruction or willful damage
done to institutions dedicated to religion” is a violation of the laws or customs of war
enumerated under art. 3(d) of the ICTY Statute: “The IMT, the jurisprudence of this
International Tribunal, and the 1991 ILC Report, inter alia, have all singled out the
destruction of religious buildings as a clear case of persecution as a crime against
humanity.” Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, ¶ 206 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001). In addition: the act “when perpetrated
with the requisite discriminatory intent, amounts to an attack on the very religious
identity of a people. As such, it manifests a nearly pure expression of the notion of
‘crimes against humanity,’ for all of humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a
unique religious culture and its concomitant cultural objects.” Id. at ¶ 207. The Trial
Chamber therefore found that “the destruction and willful damage of institutions
dedicated to Muslim religion or education, coupled with the requisite discriminatory
intent, may amount to an act of persecution.” Id. at ¶ 207. Yugoslav People’s Army
(JNA), were both convicted, inter alia, of the war crime under art. 3(d) in connection
with the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik during the breakup of the former
Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 318–329
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005); See also Prosecutor v. Jokić,
Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Judgement, ¶¶ 8, 21, 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004). Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj
Pterović, Valentin Čorić and Berislav Pušić, all members of the Croatian Defence
Council (HVO), were convicted, inter alia, of the destruction or significant damage of
ten mosques in East Mostar by the HVO’s shooting and shelling, and of the intentional
destruction of the Stari Most (Old Bridge), a historic and culturally significant
“international landmark” crossing the Neretva River between East and West Mostar in
Bosnia. The TC recognized “the exceptional character and the historical and symbolic
nature” of the Bridge, detailing its history and noting its importance “both for the
inhabitants of the town of Mostar and to which it gave its name and for . . . the Balkan
region.” See Prosecutor v. Prlić, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgement, ¶ 1282 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013).
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case.3 This judgment marks a first under several aspects, and scholars, such
as Mark A. Drumbl and others, have published excellent studies regarding
that case’s decision and proceedings by extending the analytic lens into
different places and varied spaces.4
In every scholarly publication, however, authors have failed to explore
two components of the ICC judgment that are worth noting: first, the role
played by the inhabitants of the Timbuktu area in preserving and
safeguarding the buildings and institutions that have been then destroyed;
and second, the elements of restorative justice traceable in the ICC Trial
Chamber (TC)’s reasoning, in the behavior of those convicted, and in the
kind of reparation the TC and the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) awarded to
victims.5

3

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment (Sept. 27, 2016).
Mark A. Drumbl, From Timbuktu to The Hague and Beyond: The War Crime of
Intentionally Attacking Cultural Property, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 77 (2019); Francesca
Capone, An Appraisal of the Al
Mahdi Order on Reparations and Its Innovative Elements: Redress for Victims of Crimes
Against Cultural Heritage, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 645 (2018); Paige Casaly, Al Mahdi
Before the ICC: Cultural Property and World Heritage in International Criminal Law,
14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1199 (2016); Marina Lostal, The Misplaced Emphasis on the
Intangible Dimension of Cultural Heritage in the Al Mahdi Case at the ICC, 1 Inter
Gentes 45 (2017); Sebastián A. Green Martínez, Destruction of Cultural Heritage in
Northern Mali: A Crime Against Humanity?, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1073 (2016); Tullio
Scovazzi, La prima sentenza della Corte penale internazionale in tema di distruzione di
beni culturali [The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court on the
Destruction of Cultural Property], 11 DIRITTI UMANI E DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 77
(2017) (It.).
5
At the same time, even this case had not escaped criticism. For example, Al Mahdi
was only prosecuted for destroying cultural heritage, even though he also allegedly
committed murder and rape. Questions arise also on why the ICC spent its scarce
resources prosecuting this mid-level militiaman rather than the leaders behind the
violence in Mali. Similar questions are justified because the ICC does not explain why it
makes the judicial choices it does. In recent years, scholars, activists, and politicians have
accused the ICC of being anti-African, of failing to meet the needs of victims, and of
being a “political” court, among other criticisms. See, e.g., Marieke de Hoon, The ICC’s
Al Mahdi Case Is (Also) a Political Trial, and That’s Fine!, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 31,
2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-iccs-al-mahdi-case-is-also-a-political-prial-and-thatsfine/#more-14533 [https://perma.cc/35G8-2MZ6].
4
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This article will present (1) a summary of the Al Mahdi case and the ICC
judgment; (2) an excursus on the crimes against culture at international
level; (3) an analysis of the notion of ‘heritage community’ as applied to the
Timbuktu community engaged in the protection of their cultural heritage;
and (4) an analysis of the restorative justice measures taken by the ICC as
part of the reparation awarded (5 and 6).

2. THE ICC JUDGMENT IN THE AL MAHDI CASE
On September 27, 2016, the ICC Chamber VIII convicted Ahmad Al
Faqi Al Mahdi of the war crime of attacking protected objects as a coperpetrator under art. 8(2)(e)(iv) and 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and
sentenced him to nine years of imprisonment.6
In early April 2012, following the retreat of Malian armed forces, the
groups Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took
control of the Timbuktu area of Northern Mali. From then until January
2013, Ansar Dine and AQIM imposed their religious and political control
over the territory of Timbuktu and its people through the effective
functioning of a local government, which included an Islamic tribunal, an
Islamic police force, a media commission, and a morality brigade called the
Hesbah.7 The aim of these armed Islamist groups was to impose Sharia law
throughout Mali.8

6

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Sept. 27, 2016).
See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Agreement Regarding Admission of
Guilt, 9–10 (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2016_06550.PDF
[https://perma.cc/66YX-7EX3].
8
INT’L CRIM. CT., SITUATION IN MALI: ART. 53(1) REPORT (Jan. 16, 2013),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact
=8&ved=2ahUKEwjVkanmqYPsAhWBvZ4KHYvHBkkQFjAAegQIBBAB&url=https%
3A%2F%2Fwww.icccpi.int%2FitemsDocuments%2FSASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf&
usg=AOvVaw3Bf1G03Hq2ptPsb58yYp20 [https://perma.cc/L8JL-37SF]; see also
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi at the ICC: Confirmation of Charges (Open Soc’y Just.
Initiative,
Briefing
Paper,
2016),
7
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Al Mahdi joined the Ansar Dine armed group in April 2012 and, as an
expert on matters of religion,9 he was consulted in this capacity, including
by the Islamic tribunal. In May 2012, he was appointed to lead the Hesbah
with the goal to regulate the morality of the Timbuktu people’s conduct and
to prevent, suppress, and repress anything perceived by the occupiers to
constitute “a visible vice.” Indeed, for the Timbuktu population, the
mausoleums of saints and mosques “constitute a common heritage for the
community”;10 as places of prayer and, for some, places of pilgrimage,
those structures were an integral part of their religious lives.
Al Mahdi was asked to monitor those sacred places visited by the
residents with the goal to raise awareness among the population to stop
engaging in “unlawful” religious practices and, eventually, to prohibit those
practices. He performed this task for one month, taking notes on the
inhabitants’ behavior at the mausoleums, meeting with local religious
leaders, and explaining on the radio what could and could not be done at the
mausoleums. In June 2012, the leaders of Ansar Dine and AQIM decided to
destroy the mausoleums. Al Mahdi was also consulted and, although he
recognized “that all Islamic jurists agree on the prohibition of any
construction over a tomb” (such as the mausoleums), he “recommended not
destroying the mausoleums so as to maintain relations between the
population and the occupying groups.”11
Despite Al Mahdi’s initial reservation, he agreed to conduct the attack,
and he wrote a sermon dedicated to the destruction of the mausoleums,
which was read at the Friday prayer before the attack’s launch. Al Mahdi
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-almahdi-iccconfirmation-charges%2020160225.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F8Z-CHKS].
9
Al Mahdi belongs to a family recognized in his community for having a particularly
high knowledge of Islam, he received Koranic education since his childhood, expounded
a thorough knowledge of the Koran, and gave lectures as an expert on religious matters.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Summary of the Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 11, https://www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/160926Al-MahdiSummary.pdf, [https://perma.cc/34TJ-AN5J].
10
See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 34 (Sept. 27, 2016).
11
Id. at ¶ 36 (emphasis added).
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personally determined the sequence in which the buildings were to be
attacked between June 30, 2012, and July 11, 2012. All ten sites were
religious and historic monuments, not military targets; in addition, except
for the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum, all the
buildings had the status of protected UNESCO World Heritage sites in
accordance with the 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage.12
Regarding the modes of responsibility,13 in light of the evidence, the
Chamber found Al Mahdi a co-perpetrator in the commission of a war
crime. Al Mahdi was involved in planning and preparing the attack, had
overall responsibility for the execution of the attack, determined the
12
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, art.
6(1), Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
13
The modes of responsibility are explained as follows:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person: (a) commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is
criminally responsible; (b) orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a
crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; (c) for the purpose of facilitating
the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its
commission; (d) in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) be made
with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) be made in the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime; (e) in respect of the crime of
genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide; (f) attempts
to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by
means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of
circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. However, a person who
abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion
of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the
attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up
the criminal purpose.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(3), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
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sequence in which the buildings would be destroyed, made the necessary
logistical arrangements, and justified the attack to the world through media
interviews. Namely, Al Madhi personally and directly participated in the
destruction of five buildings. In a press interview during the attacks, Al
Mahdi affirmed:
I don’t know the truth about those saints. We just know that fools .
. . come and take sand from those places to get blessed . . . That is
why we consider this campaign as an effort that is exerted in
collaboration with the imams . . . We only paid attention to the
buildings constructed above the graves in the cemetery, and the
tombs that are annexed to the mosques from the outside . . . As for
demolishing these buildings, . . . we think that we have already
introduced this matter gradually, as we’ve spent four months
explaining to the people what’s right and what’s wrong, and now’s
the time for implementation.14
Al Mahdi was transferred to The Hague on September 26, 2015, in
accordance with a warrant issued on September 18, 2015, by the Single
Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I, and his first appearance occurred on
September 30, 2015.15 The criminal proceedings ended less than one year
later on September 27, 2016, expedited by a plea agreement reached on
February 18, 2016.16 On June 8, 2016, the Chamber appointed a Legal
14

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Sept. 27, 2016).
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ ¶ 1-7 (Sept. 27, 2016).
16
The Lubanga case lasted nearly a decade, starting with Mr. Lubanga’s arrest under a
warrant issued by the ICC in March 2006 and concluding with the Appeals Chamber
judgment in December 2014. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (April 5, 2012); Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/0401/06-3121-Red, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His
Conviction (Dec. 1, 2014). Granted that one does not want to see fair trial guarantees
sacrificed in favor of a quick resolution of the case, the Al Mahdi case demonstrates how
international criminal law can strike a balance between pragmatic considerations of
efficiency and principled demands of justice in practice. See Marina Aksenova, The Al
Mahdi Judgment and Sentence at the ICC: A Source of Cautious Optimism for
International Criminal Justice, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/theal-mahdi-judgment-and-sentence-at-the-icc-a-source-of-cautious-optimism-forinternational-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/PZ4B-TJBL].
15
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Representative of Victims (LRV) and, in total, eight victims participated in
the trial proceedings.17
During the trial, held from August 22 to 24, 2016, Al Mahdi made an
admission of guilt, the Chamber heard three witnesses presented by the
Prosecution and considered the hundreds of documentary evidence items
also accepted by the accused. Al Mahdi was charged with intentionally
directing attacks against ten buildings of a religious and historical character
in Timbuktu, Mali, between June 30 and July 11, 2012.18
These aspects call for more analysis regarding the international legal
framework for the protection of cultural property.

3. THE RECOGNITION OF CRIMES AGAINST CULTURE AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The prosecution of Al Mahdi by the ICC and the decision rendered by
the Chamber mark a solid stand in favor of the recognition of the worth of
cultural heritage for people, the international community and humanity
itself, and of the necessity to prosecute not just the destruction of protected
objects, but also the intentional attacks against them.
Indeed, under art. 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute dealing with war
crimes, the criminal conduct required is an intentional attack against
buildings that are dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable

17
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-97-Red, Decision on Victim Participation at
Trial and Common Legal Representation of Victims (June 8, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/12-01/15-97-Red
[https://perma.cc/VQ75HCAE].
18
The buildings were: (i) the Sidi Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit Mausoleum;
(ii) the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum; (iii) the Sheikh Sidi El
Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum; (iv) the Alpha Moya
Mausoleum; (v) the Sheikh Mouhamad El Mikki Mausoleum; (vi) the Sheikh Abdoul
Kassim Attouaty Mausoleum; (vii) the Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi
Mausoleum; (viii) the Sidi Yahia Mosque door and the two mausoleums adjoining the
Djingareyber Mosque, namely (ix) the Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum and (x) the Bahaber
Babadié Mausoleum. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 38 (Sept.
27, 2016).
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purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.19 The
Trial Chamber (TC) could not have looked at the ICTY jurisprudence for
guidance because “in contrast to the [Rome] Statute, its [ICTY] applicable
law does not govern ‘attacks’ against cultural objects but rather punishes
their ‘destruction or willful damage.’ Thus, the legal contexts differ.”20 This
difference means that solely the intentional attack to buildings of religious,
educational, social, or historical importance is recognized by the Rome
Statute among the most serious criminal conducts that falls within the
jurisdiction of the ICC.
The previously mentioned illegal conduct, as specified by the ICC
Chamber, does not constitute a crime against persons but is a crime against
property and, in the view of the Chamber, even if inherently dangerous, the
latter is generally of lesser gravity than crimes against persons.21 This
distinction has legal consequences for the resultant type and length of
punishment.22
Regarding the significance of the loss of cultural heritage stemming from
Al Mahdi’s actions, the Chamber emphasized that “the wide diffusion of
culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are
19

The article reads:
2. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: . . . (e) Other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character, within the established framework of international law,
namely, any of the following acts: . . . (iv) Intentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(3), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
20
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 16 (Sept. 27, 2016).
21
Id. at ¶ 77.
22
“[N]ot all crimes forming the grounds for a criminal conviction are necessarily of
equivalent gravity and the Chamber has the duty to weigh each by distinguishing, for
example, between those against persons and those targeting property.” Id. at ¶ 72
(emphasis added).
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indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all
the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.”23 The
Chamber thus characterized the attack to those mausoleums and mosques as
a clear “affront to [those] values.”24
Similarly, in bringing the case, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda focused
on the importance of those buildings and monuments to both the
community’s identity and the collective conscience of the entire
international community. ICC Prosecutor Bensouda argued that “[s]uch an
attack against buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments . . .
destroy[ed] the roots of an entire people and profoundly and irremediably
affect[ed] its social practices and structures.”25 She then described the
importance of the mausoleums in the everyday lives of the citizens of
Timbuktu, noting that after their destruction, “[i]t became impossible for
the inhabitants of Timbuktu to devote themselves to their religious practices
. . . [which] were deeply rooted in their lives . . . [and] signified the deepest
and most intimate part of a human being: faith.”26 Bensouda also clearly
stated that the case was not about determining who was right or wrong from
a religious point of view because to intentionally direct an attack against
such monuments is a war crime under the Rome Statute “regardless of the

23

Id. at ¶ 46.
Id at ¶ 46. In the middle of the XVIII century, Emer de Vattel deplored the “willful
destruction of public monuments, temples, tombs, statues, paintings, etc. because it is
never conducive to the rightful object of war.” He declared that those who destroy
cultural property during war are “sworn enemies of the human race to deprive it lightly of
such monuments of the arts and models of taste.” Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou
Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des
Souverains 168 (vol. 1, 1758), translated by Author.
25
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the Opening of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing
in the Case Against Mr Ahmad Al-Faqi Al Mahdi (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-01-03-16 [https://perma.cc/7ME3-AQKB].
26
Id.
24
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judgement by other people on the religious practices by the inhabitants of
Timbuktu.”27
In addition to the cultural consequences to Mali, the Prosecutor also
noted that the mausoleums were of historical and cultural importance for all
of Africa and the entire world because “cultural heritage is the mirror of
humanity.”28 Bensouda noticed that, “with one exception, all of [the] sites
in Timbuktu had been designated by UNESCO as World Heritage sites”
because they “constituted a chapter in the history of humanity,” and as a
consequence humanity as a whole was affected by that loss.29 She
emphasized that, after the destruction of the mausoleums in historic
Timbuktu, “humanity’s collective conscience was shocked by the senseless
destruction of its common heritage” and humanity had “to stand firm in
rejecting [those] crimes through concrete punitive action.”30
In an effort to reinforce the prosecutor’s analysis of this significant loss
of cultural icons, the TC’s judgment reflected on the impact on the
community.31 In assessing the seriousness of Al Mahdi’s acts for the
purpose of sentencing, the Chamber noted the testimony of an expert
witness, who stated, “Timbuktu is at the heart of Mali’s cultural heritage”
and the mausoleums in question “were of great importance to the people of
Timbuktu . . . and played a psychological role . . . of being perceived as
protecting the people of Timbuktu.”32 The Chamber acknowledged that “the
fact that the targeted buildings . . . [had] a symbolic and emotional value for
the inhabitant of Timbuktu is relevant in assessing the gravity of the crime
committed.”33
27

Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
The sites “constitute a common heritage” for the local Timbuktu community and the
TC’s judgment described them as “an integral part of the religious life of [Timbuktu’s]
inhabitants.” Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 34 (Sept. 27, 2016).
32
Id. at ¶ 78.
33
Id. at ¶ 79.
28
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This sentiment, and its weight in determining the content of the sentence,
appeared often throughout the testimonies of the witnesses. Witness P-431
emphasized that “when it came to the destruction of the Timbuktu
mausoleums, this was indeed a matter of an activity of war to
psychologically kill the people of Timbuktu, destroying the property or
buildings for which they had an effective [sic] attachment . . . It consists of
killing the enemy in that [people]’s soul.”34
Witness P-151, supporting the belief that heritage is part of cultural life,
similarly described how the entire international community was suffering as
a result of the destruction of the protected sites.35 Art, architecture, and
literature are anchors for humanity, reminding us of the values tying
communities together. Their preservation is thus essential for the formation
of collective consciousness on both local and global levels.
Accordingly, the Chamber reiterated that the attack to all sites appeared
to be of particular gravity as their destruction does not only affect the direct
victims of the crimes, namely the “faithful and inhabitants of Timbuktu, but
also people throughout Mali and the international community.”36
Indeed, the recognition of a multiplicity of victims, direct and indirect,
and the range of victims involved has been used by the Chamber as one of
the most relevant elements for assessing the gravity of the crime.37
Despite the positive outcome of Al Mahdi’s judgment, several critiques
offer important perspectives on how judicial reasoning in criminal attacks
against cultural heritage could develop in the future. Analyzing these
perspectives could also strengthen the judicial culture to ensure that there is

34
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Trial Hearing Transcript, ¶¶ 89–90 (Aug.
23,
2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2016_05772.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DKD-UALH].
35
Id. at ¶¶ 59–61.
36
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶¶ 39, 46 (Sept. 27, 2016); See
also Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Prosecution’s Submissions on
Sentencing, ¶¶ 17–29, 61 (July 22, 2016).
37
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Transcript (Aug. 24, 2016).
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justice for populations whose heritage is targeted and subjected to
destruction by extremist religious groups like Ansar Dine, AQIM, and
ISIS.38
One critical argument considers how the debate between universalism
and cultural relativism influences the decisions to prosecute attacks on
cultural heritage, and also how the ICC should take a relativist approach to
determining the merits and admissibility of charges for those attacks. That
view supports having judges who do not limit recognizing the gravity of
such crimes to cultural property that is qualified as a World Heritage Site.39
According to another argument, although the Al Mahdi decision was
lauded for recognizing the link between the attacks and cultural destruction
and for the precedential value of such recognition in international criminal
law, the ICC did not invoke the crime of cultural genocide that focuses on
the destruction of cultural identity of groups.40

4. AN EXAMPLE OF A “HERITAGE COMMUNITY” INVOLVED IN THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
The local community of Northern Mali and its actions to take care of the
mausoleums and other local buildings is a quintessential example of a
“heritage community,” which is a community of people interested in
preserving, valuing and transmitting to future generation some cultural
heritage, aside from the fact that they did not personally create, or
participate in the creation of, that cultural heritage.

38
On the reasons why the Hisbah in Mali destroyed cultural property, and the shortfalls
in the TC’s consideration of the rationales for the protection and destruction of cultural
property, see Mohamed Elewa Badar & Noelle Higgins, Discussion Interrupted: The
Destruction and Protection of Cultural Property Under International Law and Islamic
Law - the Case of Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 486 (2107).
39
Paige Casaly, Al Mahdi Before the ICC: Cultural Property and World Heritage in
International Criminal Law, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1199 (2016).
40
Leora Bilsky & Rachel Klagsbrun, The Return of Cultural Genocide?, 29 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 373 (2018).
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Some clarifications on the specific notion of “heritage community” help
to better understand this assumption regarding the relationship between the
people of Northern Mali and their local cultural heritage. The previously
mentioned notion was introduced by the Council of Europe’s (CoE)
Framework Convention on the role of cultural heritage in society (the Faro
Convention).41 The Convention describes heritage communities as
“consist[ing] of people who value specific aspects of cultural heritage
which they wish, within the framework of public action, to sustain and
transmit to future generations.”42 This notion is very entwined with the
enriched definition of cultural heritage, set forth in the same Convention:
“cultural heritage is a group of resources inherited from the past which
people identify, independently of ownership, as a reflection and expression
of their constantly evolving values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions. It
includes all aspects of the environment resulting from the interaction
between people and places through time.”43 Heritage is thus recognized as
significant not just to those who, directly or indirectly, create it, but, as
accurately emphasized by some authors, “the Faro perspective suggests that
cultural heritage is not just ‘someone’s heritage[,]’[] but involves strong
symbolic constructs that also interest ‘others[,]’[] and this touches you and
me, not just its bearers or practitioners.”44 The Faro Convention recognizes
41

Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for
Society art. 2, Oct. 27, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 199 [hereinafter The Faro Convention], The
Faro Convention, adopted by the CoE Committee of Ministers on October 13, 2005, has
been in force since June 1, 2011. To date, twenty states have ratified it: Armenia, Austria,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg,
the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Ukraine, and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” Five States
have signed the Convention without ratifying it: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, San
Marino, and Spain. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 199, COUNCIL OF
EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/199/signatures?p_auth=dg2WfyCT [https://perma.cc/JZC9-JQWB].
42
The Faro Convention, at art. 2(b).
43
Id. at art. 2(a).
44
Antonio Arantes, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Brazil, Session 2 Keynote
Address at Cultural Heritage. Scenarios 2016: Cultural Heritage Inspires (Nov. 26, 2015)
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that “cultural heritage establishes a dialogue with cultural repertoires of
‘others,’ possibly inspiring and being inspired by them, both symbolically
and practically, and is thus open to innovations.”45
The indistinctness, or apparent vagueness, of the notion of a heritage
community does not represent a limitation.46 Rather, the emphasis is on its
dynamic aspects and its adaptability and flexibility to the community’s
needs; it values the specific interactions between its members and other
communities too.47 Thus, this open definition of heritage community is not
characterized by any geographical, ethnic, or socio-cultural unchanging
criteria. Though some common elements may be shared (a religion, a
geographical context, a behavior, a feeling, a language, or a specific historic
and cultural background), there is no rigid list of communities generating
determinants. The only requirement for giving substance to the notion at
stake is represented by the capacity and intensity of the determinant(s) in
connecting the individuals within the community, sharing the cultural
values, participating in the cultural life of the community, and desiring to
safeguard and transmit that heritage to future generations.48
The Faro Convention also refers to heritage communities in declaring
that States Parties “undertake to take into consideration the value attached
by each heritage community to the cultural heritage with which it

(transcript
available
at
https://www.unive.it/media/allegato/centri/CESTUDIR/CulturalHeritage-April2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6WU-MMH2] at 61).
45
Id.; see also Antonio Arantes, Cultural Heritage Misfits: Perspectives from
Developing Worlds, in CULTURAL HERITAGE. SCENARIOS 2015–2017 265 (Simona
Pinton
&
Lauso
Zagato
eds.,
2017),
https://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/media/pdf/books/978-88-6969-225-3/978-88-6969-2253_MQpSP8B.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPC3-YSGC].
46
See Simona Pinton & Lauso Zagato, Verso un regime giuridico ad hoc per le
comunità patrimoniali?, 37/39 ANTROPOLOGIA MUSEALE ETNOGRAFIA PATRIMONI
CULTURE VISIVE 22 (2015-16) (It.).
47
Id. at 24.
48
See id.
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identifies.”49 The object of the obligation may appear undetermined but the
legal existence and recognition of the obligation itself is not at stake.50 The
elusiveness stems rather from the expression “to take into consideration.”51
In any case the conduct of States Parties has to be in compliance with
another obligation set for them in the Faro Convention, namely the Parties
undertake to develop “through the Council of Europe, a monitoring function
covering legislations, policies and practices concerning cultural heritage,
consistent with the principles established by this Convention.”52 Article 16
of the Faro Convention provides a mechanism for monitoring compliance.53
So conceptualized, the notion of a heritage community best defines what
the “right to cultural heritage” means: not simply the right to benefit from
the existing heritage, but the right to take part in the “selection,”
“valorization,” and “recreation” of cultural expressions, both tangible and
intangible.54 The recognition of the right to cultural heritage55 marks

49

See The Faro Convention, supra note 41, at art. 12(b).
Pinton & Zagato, supra note 46, at 25.
51
Id.
52
See The Faro Convention, supra note 41, at art. 15.
53
Art. 16(a) states: “The Committee of Ministers, pursuant to Article 17 of the Statute of
the Council of Europe, shall nominate an appropriate committee or specify an existing
committee to monitor the application of the Convention, which will be authorized to
make rules for the conduct of its business.” The Faro Convention, supra note 41, at art.
16(a).
54
See Simona Pinton, La Convenzione di Faro: Alcuni Profili di Diritto Internazionale,
in IL VALORE DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE PER LA SOCIETÀ E LA COMUNITÀ: LA
CONVENZIONE DEL CONSIGLIO D’EUROPA TRA TEORIA E PRASSI 73, 81–89 (Luisella
Pavan-Woolfe & Simona Pinton eds., 2019).
55
Art. 4 states:
The Parties recognize that: (a) everyone, alone or collectively, has the right to
benefit from the cultural heritage and to contribute towards its enrichment; (b)
everyone, alone or collectively, has the responsibility to respect the cultural
heritage of others as much as their own heritage, and consequently the
common heritage of Europe; (c) exercise of the right to cultural heritage may
be subject only to those restrictions which are necessary in a democratic
society for the protection of the public interest and the rights and freedoms of
others.
The Faro Convention, supra note 41, at art. 4.
50
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another innovative element of the Faro Convention.56 This legal instrument
has so solemnly declared that the right to cultural heritage belongs to the
realm of human rights and sets forth another clear obligation for States
Parties “to undertake to ensure, in the specific context of each Party, that
legislative provisions exist for exercising the right to cultural heritage.”57
As mentioned, the Faro Convention is a framework agreement. Thus, it
addresses, in terms of principles and recommendations, the conduct of
States Parties on one side, but focuses very much on the participation of
heritage communities in the processes concerning the safeguarding and
valorization of cultural heritage on the other. By adopting the notion of the
heritage community, States Parties to the Faro Convention are indeed
tracing an innovative paradigm in the international legal horizon connected
to cultural heritage. This paradigm underscores the relationship among the
social and environmental contexts, cultural heritage, and cultural policies to
be adopted by both public and private institutions.
As a regional treaty, then, its legal milieu is evidently different from the
African one. Nevertheless, the Faro Convention is an open agreement, and
this means that it is also open to the accession of States which are nonmembers of the Council of Europe.58
The behavior and beliefs of Timbuktu’s residents indicated that the
mausoleums of saints and mosques of Timbuktu were and are integral to
their religious lives, and other subjects outside the areas of Northern Mali
and Mali felt outrage themselves. Accordingly, based on the outlined notion
of heritage community as a term of art, both categories of individuals may
be considered victims, direct and indirect, of the crime under art.8(2)(e)(iv)
of the Rome Statute, as members of a heritage community.

56
See Lauso Zagato, (In-)tangible Cultural Heritage as a World of Rights?, in
CULTURAL HERITAGE. SCENARIOS 2015–2017, supra note 45, at 521, 531–533.
57
See The Faro Convention, supra note 41, at art. 5(c).
58
See The Faro Convention, supra note 41, at art. 19.
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As previously stated, the manuscripts and the mausoleums of the saints
are at the heart of Mali’s cultural heritage: they reflect parts of Timbuktu’s
history and its role in the expansion of Islam; they reflect the commitment
of the people of Timbuktu to Islam; and they play a psychological role to
the extent that they are perceived as protecting the people of Timbuktu.
As described by witness P-151 during the trial’s hearings, the people of
Timbuktu had collectively ensured that the mausoleums remained in good
condition through symbolic maintenance events involving the entire
communitywomen, the elderly, and young people alike.59 The Chamber
also valued the testimony of witness P-431, who reiterated that the people
of Timbuktu protested against the destruction and refused to see the
mausoleums razed to the ground:
… [D]estroying the mausoleums, to which the people of Timbuktu
had an emotional attachment, was a war activity aimed at breaking
the soul of the people of Timbuktu. In general, the population of
Mali, who considered Timbuktu as a source of pride, was
indignant to see these acts take place.60
A resident of the city once expressed a similar sentiment on Radio France
Internationale: “[t]he people are very, very angry today because the
mausoleum is the symbol of Timbuktu.”61
The international reaction that followed the campaign of cultural
destruction in Timbuktu also contributed to the idea that a heritage
community may be constituted by people other than the country’s
inhabitants.

Algeria,

for

example,

through

its

Foreign

Ministry

59
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶¶ 34, 78 (Sept. 27, 2016); see
also Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-135-Conf, LRV Sentencing Observations
¶¶ 26–31 (July 22, 2016).
60
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 80 (Sept. 27, 2016).
61
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the Opening of Trial in the Case Against Mr Ahmad
Al-Faqi Al Mahdi (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otpstat-al-mahdi-160822 [https://perma.cc/ZQY3-3UXU].
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Spokesperson, strongly condemned the attacks, stating that the mausoleums
“are not only part of the Islamic cultural heritage belonging to the memory
and the collective consciousness of Mali, but also as a common heritage
shared by both Algeria and Mali.” The Chairperson of the African Group at
the UNESCO moreover emphasised that “it [was] not only Mali which is
affected by the destruction of heritage sites in that country. Mali’s heritage
sites are Africa’s heritage sites, and they are also the world’s heritage
sites.”62

5. GLINTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE PROCEEDINGS
The Al Mahdi case gives an example of what restorative justice can look
like in the context of a legal proceeding. Al Mahdi’s admission of guilt and
his cooperation with the prosecution was the decisive factor in determining
his sentence.
Al Mahdi showed repentance and called on the people not to replicate the
same acts he was involved in “because they are not going to lead to any
good for humanity.”63 He insisted that the remorse he was feeling was for
the damage caused to his family, his community in Timbuktu, his country,
and the international community.64 He also made the solemn promise that
“this was the first and the last wrongful act [he] will ever commit.”65
Al-Mahdi’s remorse attested to the potential for rehabilitation. Article
10(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underlines
reformation and social rehabilitation of the offender as one of the aims of
the penitentiary system.66 According to General Comment n. 21 of the

62

Id.
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶ 103 (Sept. 27, 2016).
64
Id.
65
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG, Trial Chamber VIII
Transcript, 8 (Aug. 22, 2016).
66
“The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of
which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be
segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal
63
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Human Rights Committee on that article 10, “no penitentiary system should
be only retributory; it should essentially seek the reformation and social
rehabilitation of the prisoner,” and “States parties are invited to specify
whether they have a system to provide assistance after release and to give
information as to its success.”67 States should adopt legislative provisions,
administrative provisions, or practical measures to ensure the re-education
of convicted persons. Namely, specific measures should be taken by States
“to provide teaching, education and re-education, vocational guidance and
training and also concerning work programmes for prisoners inside the
penitentiary establishment as well as outside.”68
International criminal law often overlooks the sentencing objective of
rehabilitation of the convicted, but in the case of Al Mahdi, the judges were
able to appraise that Al Mahdi’s admission of guilt and cooperation with the
prosecution’s work showed that he would be likely to successfully
reintegrate into society.69
Moreover, because the ICC has finally acknowledged the significance of
the destruction done, the Tribunal recognized that the admission of guilt
may have furthered peace and reconciliation in Northern Mali by alleviating
the victims’ moral suffering.70 Indeed, Al Mahdi also communicated
sentiments of empathy towards the victims of the crime he committed and,

status.” G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
10(3) (Dec. 16, 1966).
67
Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment
No. 21: Replaces General Comment 9 Concerning Humane Treatment of Persons
Deprived of Liberty (Art. 10) ¶ 10 (Apr. 10, 1992).
68
Id. at ¶ 11. The issue of rehabilitation for the victims of crimes as a form of reparation
is a different issue. On rehabilitation as a form of reparation for victims of gross human
rights violations from the point of view of health professionals, see Nora Sveaass, Gross
Human Rights Violations and Reparation Under International Law: Approaching
Rehabilitation as a Form of Reparation, 4 EUR. J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 1 (2013).
69
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment, ¶¶ 97–99 (Sept. 27, 2016).
70
Id. at ¶ 100.
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as a tangible act, he offered to reimburse the imam of the Sidi Yahia
Mosque for the cost of replacing the door.71
Al Mahdi’s behavior and confession illustrated his recognition of the
gravity of the destruction and the victims’ suffering, but also his remorse
for his acts. These outcomes are practical examples of what restorative
justice can look like in a criminal legal proceeding.
Restorative justice is a paradigm proposed by a theory of justice that
distances itself from retributive elements.72 Restorative justice calls the
focus upon the social implications of the crimes committed as a specific
aspect of the relationship between victims and perpetrators. In doctrine, the
concept of restorative justice is widely used to emphasize redress to or
restoration of victims and the wider community, and the reintegration of the
offender into the community.73
Some authors describe “restorative justice” in the following way:
[A] concept that aims to involve the offender, the victim and the
community in a somehow equal basis in their search for repair,
reconciliation and justice. Rather than punishing only the
perpetrator for the crimes committed, this concept includes
measures of mediation, community service, restitution and other

71
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG, Trial Chamber VIII
Transcript, ¶ 104 (Aug. 22, 2016).
72
Retributive justice is the theory that advances the importance of punishment and
condemnation as an objective for achieving justice because “the offender has taken an
unfair advantage in committing a crime, which can only be corrected by the
administration of a punishment.” See Declan Roche, Retribution and Restorative Justice,
in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 75, 78 (Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van
Ness eds., Routledge 2007). A more comprehensive theory of retributive justice goes
beyond the notion of punishment to be conceived as a “necessary means to achieving a
society built on justice and the rule of law.” Charles Villa-Vicencio, Transitional Justice,
Restoration, and Prosecution, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 387, 391 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., Routledge 2006).
73
Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & Clifford Shearing, Specifying Aims and
Limits for Restorative Justice: A ‘Making Amends’ Model?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS 21 (Andrew von
Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).
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forms of diversion aimed at providing redress to the victim and
reconciliation between victim and offender.74
A more holistic perspective defines restorative justice as “an evolving
response to crime that respects the dignity and equality of each person,
builds understanding, and promotes social harmony through the healing of
the victims, offenders and communities.”75 As John Braithwaite writes,
justice is restorative when it is “about restoring victims, restoring offenders,
and restoring communities as the result of a plurality of stakeholders.”76
The active engagement of the affected parties in the justice process is
indeed one key aspect of addressing the “relational and social harm”
produced by the commission of international and national crimes.
Moreover, restorative justice’s focus on rebuilding broken relationships
resonates in cases of grave crimes which heavily damage interpersonal
relations and the social fabric. This does not mean that the concept of
restorative justice should be reduced to restorative practices relying on the
voluntary deliberations of the parties directly affected by the specific crime,
such as victim-offender mediation. Rather, at the international level,
restorative justice may be chosen by the

international community to

address international crimes and take into consideration the circumstances
of each case. For this reason, restorative justice works more as an approach,
a “set of principles,”77 rather than a cluster of specific mechanisms and
measures; that is, restorative justice may inspire, to different degrees, a
variety of initiatives, programs, and systems to redress criminal and civil
offences.

74

Manfred Nowak, The Right to Reparation of Victims of Gross Human Rights
Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK 2001: REPARATIONS:
REDRESSING PAST WRONGS 275 (George Ulrich & Louise Krabbe Boserup eds., 2001).
75
Economic and Social Council Res. 2002/12, at 2 (Aug. 12, 2003).
76
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts,
25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (1999).
77
HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 3 (1st ed. 2002).
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This also means that restorative justice implies an “active responsibility”
concept, wherein offenders must take responsibility for their conduct by
contributing actively to repairing the negative consequences of their
offences.78 Under this perspective, restorative justice is significant because
it emphasizes the re-affirmation of the specific position of each party in
relation to the crime committed. For example, for many victims of the 1994
Rwandan genocide, justice meant the establishment of who did wrong and
who did right in the horrible three months during which the genocide
occurred. For many Rwandan victims, justice had to establish a recognition
of the “historical truth.”79
In the last decade, restorative justice has gained additional ground in the
context of international criminal justice by “providing a different way in
which offending and the consequence of offending are dealt with.”80
According to the UN Handbook on Restorative Justice Programs,
“restorative justice is a way of responding to criminal behavior by
balancing the needs of the community, the victims and the offender.”81
Under this perspective, restorative justice originates from the principle that
criminal behavior is not only a violation of the law, but also “a violation of
people and relationships.”82
At the same time, the theory of restorative justice helps to shed more
light upon the importance of restoration of victims’ rights and prerogatives
by focusing on the necessity of taking an appropriate action to redress the
78
See generally Lode Walgrave, Restorative Justice: An Alternative for Responding to
Crime?, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PENOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 613
(Shlomo Giora Shoham et al. eds., 2007).
79
FRANÇOISE KANKINDI & DANIELE SCAGLIONE, RWANDA, LA CATTIVA MEMORIA:
COSA RIMANE DEL GENOCIDIO CHE HA LASCIATO INDIFFERENTE IL MONDO 113 (1st ed.
2014).
80
Simon Green, The Victims’ Movement and Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 171, 185 (Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness eds., 2007).
81
U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
PROGRAMMES, at 6, U.N. Sales No. E.06.V.15 (2006).
82
HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 181 (1st
ed. 1990).
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resentment and legitimate claims of victims and survivors. However, as
plausible as this approach sounds, when atrocity crimes have been
committed, there are clear limits to what can be restored. The challenge is
to have an institutional system that shapes the responses to atrocities in a
way that includes the acknowledgement of the harm done to specific
people, the preservation of the dignity of direct and indirect victims, and the
opportunity for them to have their stories heard. This also ensures adequate
reparation in the forms of financial compensation, restitution of goods,
rehabilitation through social measures, and symbolic measures, pursued at
both the individual and collective levels.
The Al Mahdi case marks the first instance in which an international
criminal court had to consider how to compensate for damages while at the
same time examining how cultural heritage is understood. Cultural heritage
is “to be understood as encompassing the resources enabling cultural
identification and development processes of individuals and groups, which
they, implicitly or explicitly, wish to transmit to future generations.”83
The next section will examine the reparation’s measures awarded by the
Chamber, their calculation, their profiles of restorative justice, and the
implementation plan proposed by the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).

6. THE QUANTIFICATION OF CULTURAL DAMAGES AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF AWARDED REPARATION MEASURES
Although only eight victims participated in the trial process, the ICC
explored who the victims of the destruction of cultural heritage really
wereindividuals, local communities, the State of Mali, the international
communityand what constituted adequate reparations for both tangible
and intangible damage.

83

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, ¶ 15 (Aug. 17,
2017).
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In the Al Mahdi case, the Reparations Order was issued by TC VIII on
August 17, 2017.84 The Order built upon the reparation principles
established in the Lubanga85 and Katanga86 cases dealing with crimes
against persons; however, it marked the first opportunity for judges to
pronounce appropriate reparations for acts dealing solely with cultural
heritage’s destruction.
The TC determined that the crime committed by Al Mahdi caused
physical damage to the protected buildings as well as economic and moral
harm, and awarded individual, collective, and symbolic reparations.87
84

Id. Pursuant to Regulation 110(2) of the Regulations of the Registry and rule 97(2) of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the ICC Registry launched a call for experts to
assist the Court with reparations. The experts had to present knowledge in the matters of:
a) the importance of international cultural heritage generally and the harm to
the international community caused by its destruction; b) the scope of the
damage caused, including monetary value, to the ten mausoleums and mosques
at issue in the case; and c) the scope of the economic and moral harm suffered,
including monetary value, to persons or organisations as a result of the crimes
committed.
See ICC Registry, Call by the Registry of the ICC for Experts on Reparations for Victims
Within the Framework of Reparations Proceedings in the Case of the Prosecutor v.
https://www.iccAhmad
Al
Faqi
Al
Mahdi
(Oct.
20,
2016),
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161020callforexperts
[https://perma.cc/B9FE-HEGH].
The Trial Chamber appointed competent experts included on the list of experts that the
Registry of the Court created and maintained pursuant to Regulation 44 of the
Regulations of the Court.
85
Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Decision Establishing the Principles and
Procedures to be Applied to Reparations, 64–93 (Aug. 7, 2012). Lubanga was found
guilty, on March 14, 2012, of the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under
the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities (as child
soldiers). See ICC, Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Case Information Sheet (Dec.
15, 2017).
86
Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Order for Reparations Pursuant to Article 75
of the Statute, ¶¶ 29–34 (Mar. 24, 2017). Germain Katanga was found guilty on March 7,
2014, of one count of a crime against humanity and four counts of war crimes committed
on February 24, 2003, during the attack on the village of Bogoro in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. He was sentenced on May 23, 2014, to a total of twelve years’
imprisonment. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Case Information
Sheet (Mar. 20, 2018).
87
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, ¶ 60 (Aug. 17,
2017).
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Individual reparations were awarded to those who suffered “more acute
and exceptional harm relative to the rest of the Timbuktu community.”88
This included those who suffered consequential economic loss because their
livelihoods exclusively depended upon the protected buildings. “For moral
harm suffered, [individual] reparations were awarded to those whose
ancestors’ burial sites were damaged in the attack.”89
The Chamber awarded collective reparations, including guarantees of
non-repetition, to the Timbuktu community. The Chamber defined the
eligible recipients of the reparations as “organisations or persons ordinarily
residing in Timbuktu at the time of the commission of the crimes or
otherwise so closely related to the city that they can be considered to be part
of this community at the time of the attack.”90 Those ineligible for
individual reparations have the opportunity to participate in collective
reparations programs, which may include financial support to individual
businesses and families, in light of the moral harm inflicted by the sites’
destruction.91
The Chamber identified three precise groups of relevant victims: the
inhabitants of Timbuktu as the direct victims of the crime; the population of
Mali; and, notably, the international community. The latter subject is a new
facet in the reparation jurisprudence of the ICC and its inclusion in the
Order has been explained by some scholars as the consequence of the
specific qualification given to the crime for which Al Mahdi has been
convicted.92 That is: “the destruction of cultural heritage erase[d] part of the
88

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on TFV Request for Clarification
Regarding Individual Reparations for Economic Harm, at ¶ 1 (Aug. 31, 2018).
89
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, at ¶ 104(ii)–
(iii).
90
Id. at ¶¶ 82–83, 145.
91
Id. at ¶ 104. On the Reparations Order, see Francesca Capone, An Appraisal of the Al
Mahdi Order on Reparations and Its Innovative Elements: Redress for Victims of Crimes
Against Cultural Heritage, 16 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 645, 651 (2018).
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Sophie Starrenburg, Who Is the Victim of Cultural Heritage Destruction? The
Reparations Order in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, EJIL:
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heritage of all humankind,” as such causing harm to the international
community.93 Nonetheless, the TC limited the analysis and calculation of
reparation for damages primarily to the first category of victims and granted
“one symbolic euro . . . to the international community, which is best
represented by UNESCO”; and one symbolic euro to the Malian State.94
As to the latter circumstances, some criticisms explain the TC’s choice to
keep the reparations symbolic “by reason of the continued ICC’s fear to get
backlash for conducting a trial focusing solely upon the destruction of
heritage.”95
To strictly apply the distinction between crimes against people and
crimes against property to the destruction of cultural heritage does not
correctly mirror the nature and extent of crimes against cultural heritage. In
the latter crimes, people and property are interconnected. In the Reparations
Order, the TC gave account of this bond: “cultural heritage is to be
understood as encompassing the resources enabling cultural identification
and development processes of individuals and groups, which they,
implicitly or explicitly, wish to transmit to future generations.”96 Cultural
heritage thus sets a connection between present and future generations. In
addition, “Cultural heritage plays a central role in the way communities
define themselves and bond together, and how they identify with their past
and contemplate their future.”97 According to UNESCO, “the loss of
heritage during times of conflict can deprive a community of its identity
and memory, as well as the physical testimony of its past. Those destroying
TALK! (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/who-is-the-victim-of-cultural-heritagedestruction-the-reparations-order-in-the-case-of-the-prosecutor-v-ahmad-al-faqi-almahdi/ [https://perma.cc/9TSE-AMJ2].
93
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, ¶ 53 (Aug. 17,
2017).
94
Id. at ¶ 107.
95
Starrenburg, supra note 92.
96
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, ¶ 15 (Aug. 17,
2017).
97
Id. at ¶ 14.
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cultural heritage seek to disrupt the social fabric of societies.”98 Plus,
“cultural heritage is important not only in itself, but also in relation to its
human dimension. Cultural property also allows a group to distinguish and
identify itself before the world community.”99 Indeed, “the attack against
the Protected Buildings not only destroyed and damaged physical
structures. Its impact ‘rippled out into the community and diminished the
link and identity the local community had’ with such valuable cultural
heritage.”100
In the Reparation Order, the TC reiterated that the majority of the
destroyed sites were World Heritage sites, and the “greater interest vested
in an object by the international community reflects a higher cultural
significance and a higher degree of international attention and concern.”101
Regrettably, the listing process at UNESCO has been viewed as
exceedingly politicized and biased towards particular forms of heritage, so
that the existing world heritage lists do not accurately represent each culture
across the globe fairly.102 A World Heritage label should not be the only
method of showing the gravity of heritage destruction. The destroyed
cultural heritage may not always have the “luck” to be listed in the World
Heritage List at the time of targeting.103
Focusing on the quantification of the damages generated by the crime,
the TC affirmed that Al Mahdi’s indigence did not have any impact on the
reparations award, and set Al Mahdi’s total liability at 2.7 million euros. 104
The people of Timbuktu were awarded, individually, nearly the full
amount of compensation for the damage to protected buildings as well as

98

Id.
Id. at ¶ 16.
100
Id. at ¶ 19.
101
Id. at ¶ 17.
102
See Starrenburg, supra note 92.
103
Id.
104
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, ¶114 (Aug. 17,
2017).
99
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for consequential economic loss and moral harm.105 Given that the
mausoleums and the Mosque were restored by UNESCO in partnership
with the European Union and other donors, the TC focused on collective
measures to ensure the non-repetition of the attacks. The TC then focused
on the redress of the moral harm via symbolic forms of satisfactionsuch
as apologies, memorials, commemoration, or forgiveness ceremoniesto
give public recognition of the moral harm suffered by the Timbuktu
community and those within it. The quantification of the moral harm is of
particular interest for the following reasons.
The TC highlighted the “inherent difficulty in addressing and measuring
monetary values for moral harm. As submitted by the Legal Representatives
of Victims (LRV), ‘a price cannot be put on dignity, as it cannot be put on
faith, and so both are that much more difficult to restore.’”106 Nevertheless,
in the initial Reparation Order the TC, under the advice of nominated
experts, estimated in monetary terms “the mental pain and anguish suffered
. . . at approximately 437,000 USD.”107 The experts derived the amount
[F]rom an award identified in a similar case, whereby in 2009 the
Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission reflected the unique cultural
significance of the damaged Stela of Matara with a 23,000 USD
award. The expert then revised this number upwards to reflect the
fact that 10 Protected Buildings were destroyed and nine of them
held world heritage status.108
Pursuant to Regulation 56 of the Regulations of the Trust Fund, the TFV
stepped in to execute the TC Reparations Order as follows: a draft
implementation plan was submitted on May 18, 2018,109 the Updated
105

Corrected version of Draft Implementation Plan for Reparations, Executive Summary,
ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Conf-Corr, at 5–7.
106
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Reparations Order, ¶ 129 (Aug. 17,
2017).
107
Id. at ¶ 131.
108
Id.
109
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public Redacted Version of “Corrected
version of Draft Implementation Plan for Reparations” (May 18, 2018).
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Implementation Plan was presented on March 4, 2019,110 and a lesser public
redacted version was submitted on October 14, 2019.111
The TC recognized the TFV’s discretion to complement any individual
or collective reparations, which encouraged the TFV “to complement the
individual and collective awards to the extent possible, and to engage in
fundraising efforts to the extent necessary to complement the totality of the
award.”112 The TC further noted that the TFV is not limited to the
Chamber’s intermediate liability calculations set out when designing an
implementation plan, but only to its final determination on Al Mahdi’s total
liability.113
In the 2019 Lesser Public Updated Implementation Plan, the TFV
provided “detailed information concerning security and mitigation
strategies, outreach strategy, individual awards for moral and economic
harm, including method of payment, and all required details for projects –
both approved and new proposals – to respond to the collective moral and
economic harm of the case.”114 In the Plan, the TFV identified nine projects
that have been subsequently approved by the Trial Chamber.115
110

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the Updated Implementation
Plan from the Trust Fund for Victims (Mar. 4, 2019).
111
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Lesser Public Redacted Version of
“Updated Implementation Plan” Submitted on 2 November 2018 (Oct. 14, 2019).
112
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the Updated Implementation
Plan from the Trust Fund for Victims, ¶ 138 (Mar. 4, 2019).
113
Id. at ¶ 139.
114
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Lesser Public Redacted Version of
“Updated Implementation Plan” Submitted on 2 November 2018, ¶ 1 (Oct. 14, 2019).
115
Namely, the TFV proposed to award: (a) 905,000 euro as individual reparations for
the moral harm to those whose ancestors’ burial sites were damaged in the attack; (b)
356,000 euro for the damage occasioned to the Protected Buildings to be addressed
“through the rehabilitation of their enclosures, the planting of trees and living hedge,
improved lighting, surveillance, logistical assistance, training for the masons, a support
fund for the annual maintenance of the Protected Buildings, and the reconstruction of the
Al Arawani mausoleum”; (c) 1.3 million euro as collective economic reparations in
favour of the displaced population upon arrival to the Timbuktu area: “The TFV
proposed to set up an Economic Resilience Facility in Timbuktu and Bamako to support
economic initiatives proposed by members of the respective communities. This measure
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In consideration of a “restorative justice framework,” it is interesting to
note that regarding symbolic reparations as a form of collective reparations
for moral harm, the TFV mentioned a joint ceremony with the Government
of Mali and UNESCO—hosted by the former—that would have to take
place at a later stage.116
The TFV then decided, after extensive consultation, to anchor
memorialization measures on the principle of “restorative agency” whereby
the local community will be empowered to steer the process and decide for
themselves whether and how their perception of the events in 2012 linked
to Al Mahdi’s crime should be memorialized.117 To achieve this goal, “it is
essential to develop a format that is in accordance with the customs, rules
and practices.”118
In fact, Al Mahdi’s crime affected the city’s heritage “in a manner that
was tangible, immediate and visual but, most of all, it affected the
intangible meanings and associations linked to such heritage.”119 A
memorial is of a very delicate nature because it would similarly affect both
dimensions of cultural heritage and would offer a narrative of how the
community perceived and reacted to the event. This is why the TFV
decided to let the community decide how to channel grief and/or
would involve both financial support and related advisory services to members of the
community, tailored to their needs and capacities”; (d) 62,000 euro as collective moral
harm reparations,
namely to arrange psychological support both in Timbuktu and Bamako to be
delivered by psychologists in order to allow victims to choose the method of
support that best fits their needs. In order to address the pre-existing
discriminatory situation of women, the Trust Fund intends to enable safe
spaces in the form of groupe de parole pour les femmes in Timbuktu and
Bamako, which will serve as a platform for women to express their views and
emotions regarding Mr. Al Mahdi’s crime.
Id. at ¶¶ 3–6.
116
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Lesser Public Redacted Version of
“Updated Implementation Plan” Submitted on 2 November 2018, ¶ 157 (Oct. 14, 2019).
117
Id. at ¶¶ 7, 162.
118
Id. at ¶¶ 161–162.
119
Id. at ¶ 160.
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resilience.120 In contrast, the TFV decided that it was not advisable to make
further use of the apology Al Mahdi already provided during the trial.121
Also, in the spirit of a principle of restorative justice, the TFV underlined
that the proposals put forward in the Updated Implementation Plan were the
result of extensive research, careful consultations with Court’s sections, and
experts in pertinent areas— in addition to an in depth examination of
victims’ views and preferences expressed in their applications, in
communications to the LRV, and stated to the TFV itself.

7. CONCLUSION
Interests and rights of international crimes’ victims started to take center
stage in the international legal realm thanks to increased attention of the
international community for the achievement of two goals: the respect of
universal human rights and the implementation of transitional justice
changes.122 Within a few decades, international criminal law-based
institutions have reflected this development in their efforts to recognize and
implement victims’ rights, including their right to reparation.123
The most significant normative culmination of the judicial recognition of
victims’ rights in criminal trials took place with the adoption of the Rome
Statute. Indeed, this Statute incorporates a comprehensive set of rights for
victims, encompassing both procedural rights of participation and a right to

120

Id. at ¶ 160.
The sum total of 129,500 euro for symbolic reparations is to be divided as follows:
9,500 euro is to be spent for costs associated to the joint ceremony for the symbolic
awards to the Government of Mali and UNESCO, hosted by the former. The remaining
120,000 euro are to be reserved for the memorialization measure and any remnant of that
sum will be reinvested in collective moral harm programs. Id. at ¶¶ 159–165.
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RIGHTS, TRANSITION AND RECONCILIATION 210–228 (Inge Vanfaechem et al. eds.,
2016).
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reparation, grounded in the ICC’s mandate for both retributive and
restorative justice.
In addition, to respond to the real possibility that convicted perpetrators
may declare their own insolvency as in Al Mahdi, the establishment of the
TFV with its double mandate establishes an international criminal justice
system in charge of ensuring the punishment of perpetrators, the redress for
victims, and some forms of restorative justice. However, in view of the
gravity of injuries and consequences caused by the crimes falling under the
ICC’s jurisdiction, the reintegration of offenders is challenging. Another
major challenge is the reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, by
means, for instance, of in person meetings.124 An experience of restorative
justice is instead offered to victims through their participation in
proceedings, and reparations are paid out if funds are available. Indeed,
these two types of “presence” in criminal trials could empower victims and
potentially achieve effects at both the individual and collective levels: to
compensate or to reduce harm; to restore the dignity of individual victims;
and to reintegrate them into society, as well as to trigger or support a
broader process of societal reconciliation. For the perpetrator, the
possibility remains to apologize and show regret for the crimes committed.
Under this perspective, the reparation and assistance programs implemented
by the TFV could be qualified as a peculiar measure of restorative
justice.125
Nevertheless, the critical voices about the ICC’s victims regime are
several. Among them, one criticism focuses on the Court facing conceptual
challenges related to an apparent misunderstanding of the different
measures at stake: reparations as such and the various modalities and
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SIMONA PINTON, REDRESS IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA. AN INTERNATIONAL-LAW
PERSPECTIVE 232 (2019).
125
See, e.g., Claire Garbett, The International Criminal Court and Restorative Justice:
Victims, Participation and the Processes of Justice, 5 RESTORATIVE JUST. 198 (2017).

VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

379

380 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

channels of enforcing them.126 As mentioned, the ICC delegates the
implementation of reparations’ measures to the TFV, although the Court
retains judicial powers over the process, retaining the ability to block
actions in relation to the implementation of reparations if the TFV does not
abide by the rules required by the Court. This fact gives rise to a convoluted
process, which creates further barriers to the design and enforcement of
reparations on the ground.
If attention is paid to the practice of the ICC cases at the reparation stage,
in addition to Al Mahdi (i.e. Lubanga, Katanga), the victims grow
dissatisfied with the ICC reparations processes. Not only do they need to
wait for many years for a conviction to be rendered in order to benefit from
reparations, but also, when victims are finally entitled to them, they need to
wait yet again for the implementation plan to be approved by the ICC
chambers and to count upon enough financial resources.127
Realistically speaking, the current reparations process at the ICC, from
adjudication to implementation, is hardly providing justice to victims.128
One of the most challenging tasks is securing the needed funds: in fact,
deficits persist in the TFV’s voluntary fundraising from governments to

126

See, e.g., Alina Balta, Manon Bax & Rianne Letschert, Between Idealism and
Realism: A Comparative Analysis of the Reparations Regimes of the International
Criminal Court and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, INT’L J.
COMPAR.
&
APPLIED
CRIM.
JUST.
1,
5–14
(2019),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01924036.2019.1695640
[https://perma.cc/GY8X-YVLD].
127
As a Redress report puts it, “In the Lubanga case, 15 years after the commission of the
crimes in 2003, victims are yet to receive the reparations they have been waiting for,
even though the first reparations decision was handed down in 2012.” REDRESS, NO
TIME TO WAIT: REALISING REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT
10
(Jan.
2019),
https://redress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/20190221-Reparations-Report-English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MXL-7PLY].
128
See generally PINTON, supra note 124; Alina Balta et al., Trial and (Potential) Error:
Conflicting Visions on Reparations Within the ICC System, 29 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV.
221 (2019).
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cover the current and increasing cost of both reparations’ awards ordered by
the judges and the assistance mandate programs.129
Reparations awarded in any specific case cannot be dependent solely on
funding from the contributions of one or two well-intentioned donor
governments.130 And, “if the TFV continues to experience severe
underfunding each year, not only will the surviving victims unjustifiably
suffer, but the credibility of the ICC will be undermined, perhaps fatally.”131
Apart from raising awareness on these critical aspects, this article is not
the place to offer possible explanations for why the ICC has not yet
managed to make victims’ rights and reparations expectations a full reality
in practice. The interest of this article has rather been to highlight the
aspects in the Al Mahdi Reparations Order and Implementation Plan that
support the paradigm of restorative justice and the relevance of a collective
dimension in reparations that expresses the cultural identity of the people
damaged by the crime.
129
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https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/financial-information [https://perma.cc/Y8KXXLFA].
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to offer pre-qualified investors an opportunity to invest in a social bond that
would be guaranteed by several States Parties of the ICC that would be
discounted, as is common with social bonds, and the principal of the bond
would be invested by a supervised management team to achieve an annual rate
of return sufficient to cover the interest obligation payable to the investors, the
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JUST SECURITY
(Feb.
21,
2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/62655/financial-vehicles-assisting-victims-atrocity-crimessocial-bond-international-justice/ [https://perma.cc/F5RB-R6RV]. This first-ever social
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of victims of atrocity crimes.” Id.
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Furthermore, an interesting reflection is whether the reparation measures
to be adopted by the ICC should pursue a further function in combination
with, or even better, to be included in the restorative aims; that is, whether
the ICC and TFV should be engaged with transformative justice as well.132
The ICC can demonstrate transformative justice by adopting measures
that aim to transform the entire society, namely the Malian society, rather
than simply to repair and restore conditions for individuals. This issue of
providing transformative justice generates the wider theoretical question of
whether the ICC should also be engaged in promoting changes in societies
it deals with on par with the types of reparative measures adopted by
international tribunals with civil jurisdiction, such as the regional courts on
human rights.
The 2009 Cotton Field decision of the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights (IACHR) asserted that, bearing in mind an underlying structural
discrimination, reparations must be designed to change the situation so that
the effect is not only restitution, but “rectification.”133

132

This reflection could be rebuked by those scholars affirming that while it is recognized
that the ICC has ambitiously sketched out a broader restorative mandate for itself than
initially envisaged, the Court remains primarily a judicial body of retribution against
individual perpetrators and only secondarily is it a court designed to address the interests
and needs of the victims. Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court:
Three Major Issues, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 345, 346–347 (2003); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 363–366 (2001).
133
González et al. “Cotton Field” v. Mexico, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 205, ¶
450 (Nov. 16, 2009). The judgment stated,
The Court recalls that the concept of ‘integral reparation’ (restitutio in
integrum) entails the re-establishment of the previous situation and the
elimination of the effects produced by the violation, as well as the payment of
compensation for the damage caused. However, bearing in mind the context of
structural discrimination in which the facts of this case occurred, which was
acknowledged by the State . . . , the reparations must be designed to change
this situation, so that their effect is not only of restitution, but also of
rectification. In this regard, reestablishment of the same structural context of
violence and discrimination is not acceptable.
Id.
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Indeed, the objective of reparation in the classical term—to repair harm
and to return to the status existing before the unlawful acts were committed
and harms occurred—could not be enough.134 In situations of international
crimes and armed conflicts, the status quo ante is usually already marked
by violence and unjust structures and societal relations.135 Thus, a return to
that state is not desirable. Instead, comprehensive reparations processes
should seek to change structures of unjust hierarchy and social inequality.136
Scholars argue that such reparations processes should encompass three
dimensions: political representation, economic redistribution, and social
recognition.137
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The general principle of the consequences of the commission of an internationally
wrongful act was stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at
Chorzów case: “It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
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(Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 55 (July 26). In another
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INT’L L. J. 39 (2019).
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Other scholars underline that the pledges of transformation remain mere
recommendations instead of measures in practice. Most of the time, not
only “does the highly ambitious promise of structural transformation
encounter limits of practical and political feasibility,” but it risks
underestimating and distracting from the individual need for redress.138
A different set of problems concerns the legitimate authority of
international courts, especially international criminal courts, to enact farreaching social change and involve genuinely political questions of just
social norms on one side, and to risk that their court-ordered reparations
may be intrusive and paternalistic on the other.139
While these critical aspects merit further research, this article aims to
illuminate the fact that the types of reparations projects proposed by the
TFV and approved by the ICC judges incorporate both a restorative and
transformative dimension.
For instance, the memorialization project approved as a symbolic
reparation has a role to play in the construction of national historical
narratives, and for this reason, it is of a very delicate nature. Given that the
feeling of humiliation, shock, and shattered faith of the Timbuktu
community was widespread, a memorialization project would and should
similarly affect both the tangible feeling connected to the destruction of the
city’s heritage and the intangible meanings and associations linked to such
heritage. The memorialization project should offer a narrative of how the

138
Margaret Urban Walker, Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current
Trend in Thinking About Gender-Just Reparations, 10 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 108,
110 (2016).
139
Brachthäuser & Haffner, supra note 135, at 589; see also Leila Ullrich, Presentation at
Oxford Transitional Justice Research Seminar: Can Reparations Transform Societies?
The Practice of ‘Transformative Justice’ at the International Criminal Court (ICC)
(Sept. 3, 2016), http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/can-reparations-transform-societies-practicetransformative-justice-international-criminal [https://perma.cc/F9NV-YP6U].
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community perceived and reacted to the event, in accordance with its
customs, rules, and practices.140
Yet, the provision of specific collective measures such as assistance for
the return of victims to Timbuktu; an Economic Resilience Facility to
support economic initiatives proposed by members of the Timbuktu
community; the implementation of a program for psychological support;
and the creation of safe spaces for women and girls are all measures which
respond to the need to infuse some changes at the societal level. Such
changes are necessary due to structural inequalities already present in
society prior to the commission of the crimes.
In truth, these collective measures represent specific forms of guarantees
of non-repetition that in international law are themselves measures to
redress the consequences of unlawful acts.141 What has to be underlined is
the goal the above measures pursue: not only to try to avoid repetition of
the crimes themselves, but also to rectify and adjust the contextual
inequities, abuses, and violence that allowed the perpetration of crimes
140

Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Lesser Public Redacted Version of
“Updated Implementation Plan” Submitted on 2 November 2018, ¶ 162 (Oct. 14, 2019).
For instance, in Timbuktu,
the community is organised along the lines of age and gender and since their
assigned roles in society and, particularly, in relation to the Protected
Buildings are different, they may have experienced Mr[.] Al Mahdi’s crime in
diverse fashions. For this reason, the Trust Fund considers that, in Timbuktu,
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young adult women; (iii) elderly m[e]n; (iv) elderly women; and (v) children.
These committees would discuss and make a proposal on whether to
memorialise, what to memorialise and how to do it. Then, a representative
from each one of the groups would examine together in a supra-committee
whether any of their proposals can be joined. If not, they would be
implemented independently.
Id.
141
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Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 88–91
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against people and property. Guarantees of non-repetition offer the greatest
potential for transforming social relations and structures. In promising to
ensure the non-recurrence of unlawful acts, they trigger a discussion about
the underlying structural causes of violence and their manifestations and
about the broader institutional or legal reforms that might be called for to
ensure non-repetition.142
If the TFV projects (collective and symbolic) will be effectively
implemented, they would represent an important step in redressing the
failure of a system of international justice too often considered not able or
equipped to address the several root causes of international and internal
conflicts and of crimes perpetrated within those conflicts.

142
For an example of this concept as it relates to violence against women, see Rashida
Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and
Consequences), Thematic Rep. to the Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/22, ¶ 62
(Apr. 23, 2010).
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